While it might seem odd at first to include atheism, agnosticism,
and skepticism in a series on religion, these three systems of
should be addressed here. Religion is sometimes defined as
whatever about which a man is deeply concerned,' and it is to
such concerns that we now turn. Everyone, even the non-theist
attempts to make sense of and explain the reality around him.
While those who believe in some form of God attribute this
world's existence in some way to that God (or gods); the atheist,
agnostic, and skeptic form an alternative naturalistic
explanation for this world.
Since our space is limited, we
usually will refer to the three views as one, recognizing the
great overlap among them. Where their distinctions are important
we will point them out. After defining the three terms we will
review briefly the history of the non-theist (apart from God)
movement. Then we will discuss five kinds of objections which
represent most of the arguments brought by nonbelievers against a
belief in God. These five objections include problems in the
areas of language, knowledge, moral concepts, scientific method,
and logic. Since this is to be a survey of non-theistic
religions, and not a presentation of Christianity, we will not
present systematic proofs for the existence of God, but we will
present short theistic resolutions to the five problems
mentioned. We have included the names of the major philosophers
whose writings would be helpful in understanding these areas of
The word atheism comes from the Greek prefix a- (no or non-) and
the noun theos (god or God). An atheist is one who believes that
there exists positive evidence that there is no God. To the
atheist, all of existence can be explained naturally rather than
supernaturally. An atheist is convinced that all religious
belief, evidence, and faith are false.
Popular authors and philosophy professors William and Mabel
Sahakian explain it as follows:
Unlike Agnostics, the Atheist takes a definite stand, arguing
that proof regarding God's existence or nonexistence is
available, but that the evidence favors the assumption of
nonexistence (William and Mabel Sahakian, Ideas of the Great
Philosophers, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966, p.
Bishop Charles Gore summarizes atheistic belief as presupposing
that we see in the world of which we form a part no signs of
anything corresponding to the mind or spirit or purposes which
indisputably exist in man no signs of a universal spirit or
reason with which we can hold communion, nothing but blind and
unconscious force (Charles Gore, The Reconstruction of Belief,
London: John Murray, 1926, pp. 45,46).
Historically, atheism sometimes refers to a rejection of only
particular gods or a particular God. Hans Schwarz informs us that
When the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras, for instance, declared
that the sun was an incandescent stone somewhat larger than the
Peloponesus, he was accused of impiety or atheism and forced to
leave his hometown Athens (Hans Schwarz, The Search for God,
Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1975, p. 16).
Plato in his Laws X (c. 352-350 B.C.) defined two basic kinds of
atheists: those who are sincerely convinced God (or gods) does
not exist; and those who assert that there is no place for God
(or gods) in this world. The first kind of atheist is considered
moral and upright while the second kind is seen as an anarchistic
(without law) threat to society.2 Socrates may have been put to
death for being this second kind of atheist. Again, Schwarz
... when Socrates was indicted for "impiety" in 399
B.C. on grounds that he had corrupted the young and neglected the
gods during worship ceremonies ordered by the city and had
introduced religious novelties, he was sentenced to death and was
condemned to drink the hemlock within twenty-four hours. But
Socrates' position and that of other atheists was far from being
atheistic in the modem sense (ibid., p. 17).
Agnosticism comes from the Greek prefix a- (no or non-) and the
noun gnosis (knowledge, usually by experience). An agnostic is
one who believes there is insufficient evidence to prove or
disprove the existence or nonexistence of God or gods. Agnostics
criticize the theist and the atheist for their dogmatism and
their presumption of such knowledge. William and Mabel Sahakian
say that agnosticism "refers to a neutralist view on the
question of the existence of God; it is the view of the person
who elects to remain in a state of suspended judgment"
(Sahakian and Sahakian, Ideas, p. 100).
The Runes Dictionary of Philosophy defines agnosticism as:
1. (epist.) that theory of knowledge which asserts that it is
impossible for man to attain knowledge of a certain
subject-matter. 2. (theol.) that theory of religious knowledge
which asserts that it is impossible for man to attain knowledge
of God (Dagobert D. Runes, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy, Totowa,
NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Company, 1960, 1962, p. 7).
This is complemented by Peter Angeles' Dictionary of Philosophy,
which defines agnosticism as:
1. The belief (a) that we cannot have knowledge of God and (b)
that it is impossible to prove that God exists or does not exist.
2. Sometimes used to refer to the suspension of judgment... about
some types of knowledge such as about the soul, immortality,
spirits, heaven, hell, extraterrestrial life (Peter Angeles,
Dictionary of Philosophy, New York: Harper Row, Publishers, 1981,
There are two types of agnostics. One type says there is
insufficient evidence but leaves open the possibility of sometime
obtaining enough evidence to know with certainty. The second type
is convinced that it is objectively impossible for anyone to ever
know with certainty the existence or non-existence of God or
William and Mabel Sahakian add
this distinction to their definition of agnosticism (see above):
One group of Agnostics assumes that it merely lacks the facts
necessary to form a judgment and defers any conclusion pending
the acquisition of such facts; another group assumes a more
dogmatic position, contending that facts are not available
because it is impossible now (and will continue to be impossible)
to obtain these facts-a view exemplified in Immanuel Kant's
attacks upon the traditional arguments for the existence of God
(Sahakian and Sahakian, Ideas, p. 100).
Christian authors Norman Geisler and Paul Feinberg also point out
the distinction between the two kinds of agnostics:
One form of agnosticism claims that we do not know if God exists;
the other insists that we cannot know. The first we'll call
"soft" and the second "hard" agnosticism. We
are not here concerned about "soft" agnosticism, since
it does not eliminate in principle the possibility of knowing
whether God exists. It says in effect, "I do not know
whether God exists but it is not impossible to know. I simply do
not have enough evidence to make a rational decision on the
question. " We turn, then, to the "hard" form
which claims that it is im-possible to know whether God exists
(Norman Geisler and Paul Feinberg, In-troduction to Philosophy: A
Christian Perspective, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980,
Skepticism is derived from the Latin scepticus (inquiring,
reflective, doubting). The Latin in turn comes from the Greek
scepsis (inquiry, hesitation, doubt). The Greeks used the word to
refer to a certain school of philosophical thought, the Skeptics'
(see History below), who taught that because real knowledge is
unattainable, one should suspend judgment on matters of truth.
This meaning is carried in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy:
A proposition about a method of obtaining knowledge: that every
hypothesis should be subjected to continual testing; that the
only or the best or a reliable method of obtaining the knowledge
of one or more of the above kinds is to doubt until something
indubitable or as nearly indubitable as possible is found; that
wherever evidence is indecisive, judgment should be suspended;
that knowledge of all or certain kinds at some point rests on
unproved postulates or assumptions (Runes, Philosophy, p. 278).
This is confirmed by B. A. G. Fuller's A History of Philosophy,
where he reminds us that the "role of skepticism is to
remind men that knowing with absolute certainty is
impossible" (B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy, New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955, vol. 11, p. 581). Peter
Angeles shows in his definition of skepticsm that there is a
range of belief within the system. He writes,
1. A state of doubting. 2. A state of suspension of judgment. 3.
A state of unbelief or non-belief. Skepticism ranges from
complete, total disbelief in everything, to a tentative doubt in
a process of reaching certainty (Angeles, Philosophy, p. 258).
While skepticism is sometimes synonymous with certain definitions
of agnosticism, other writers distinguish between skepticism and
agnosticism as does Warren Young, who writes:
Skepticism carries the negative attitude a step farther than
agnosticism, denying the possibility of human knowledge. Truth in
an objective sense is unattainable by any means within man's
reach (Warren Young, A Christian Approach to Philosophy, Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1954, p. 61).
Keeping in mind Geisler and Feinberg's two kinds of agnosticism
(see above under the definition of agnosticism), their comments
on the differences between agnosticism and skepticism are
important. They write,
The skeptic neither affirms nor denies God's existence. And in
contrast to the (hard) agnostic, the skeptic does not say it is
impossible to know. For (hard) agnosticism too is a form of
dogmatism -negative dogmatism. The skeptic claims to take a much
more tentative attitude toward knowledge. He is not sure whether
a man can or cannot know God. In fact, the complete skeptic is
not sure of anything (Geisler and Feinberg, Philosophy, p. 299).
Because of the overlap of definitions for atheism, agnosticism,
and skepticism, it is at times difficult and even unnecessary to
distinguish one's usage of the terms. What is most important to
remember is that most non-religious people, while they may label
themselves with one of the three terms, usually have no clear
understanding of how their own views fit one category but not the
others. A person may be regarded as an atheist 'but, in actual
practice, fall under the common definition of an agnostic.
Another person may be regarded as a skeptic but admit to the
possibility of change to accept some universal truths. If someone
questions everything, the title "skeptic" can be
applied. But since certainty might be found someday it would be
appropriate to be seen as an agnostic. However, if at this time
that person does not believe in God, is "atheist" the
proper term? While the three terms are useful to us (as in
reading other philosophy works), the terms are relatively
unimportant in most personal encounters. If we can establish what
someone believes about knowledge, about obtaining knowledge, and
about the ultimate meaning of existence, then we can deal with
that person on the level at which he is comfortable. In such a
situation, the label of atheist, agnostic, or skeptic is
As we look at brief histories of atheism, agnosticism, and
skepticism, we will reverse our order of discussion to reflect
the chronological development of these three areas of
philosophical thought. There have been skeptics, atheists, and
agnostics throughout the history of mankind, and we will treat
skepticism first, then atheism, and finally agnosticism.
The Greek schools of Skepticism began around 365 B.C. The first
skeptic philosopher of note was Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 B.C.).
The Pyrrhonic School held that skepticism was so pervasive that
even their theory of skepticism was not certain. Skepticism was
adopted as a way to avoid mental and emotional distress caused by
... the central idea of the early Skeptics was to avoid mental
insecurity or doubt by abstaining from judgment on issues;
suspension of judgment (epoche) became the fundamental theory of
Skepticism. The policy of withholding judgment applied not only
to metaphysical and logical questions, but also to value
judgments pertaining to right conduct, the good, and the
desirable. . . .
The Skeptics, who were called the doubters, suspenders of
judgment, and inquirers, based their philosophy on the premise
that since we can know nothing of ultimate reality, then such
basic things are matters of indifference to us, and they must be
treated as inconsequential (William Sahakian, History of
Philosophy, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968, pp.
A second school of Skepticism is called Academic Skepticism, or
the Middle Academy. Its leaders were Arcesilaus of Pitane in
Aeolia (315-241 B.C.), Carneades of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), and
Clitomachus (187-109 B.C.). The basic premise of Academic
Skepticism is summarized well by Sahakian:
The Academic Skeptics set forth
the fundamental premise that they could know only one thing,
namely, that nothing is knowable (ibid., pp. 49,50).
The Academics spent most of their
efforts attacking the teachings of the Stoics," and their
presentation of Skepticism was often done in
direct contrast to Stoicism. Arcesilaus stated that, while one
could not know, even about ethics, one could judge probability
and that, in fact, one should order his life by probability. He
was followed by Cameades, who postulated three degrees of
1. In the first place, we have mere probability, where we act
with little or no observation of similar situations to help us,
and where the chances therefore are about fifty-fifty, but seem
worth taking in view of what we shall gain if we win.
2. Secondly, we have undisputed
probability, where empirical observation shows us that other
people have repeatedly taken the same chances successfully and to
their advantage, and have never lost. Here the face-value of the
probable truth and reliability of an impression is backed up by
all the other impressions and notions related to it.
3. Finally, we may be able to act
upon chances that not only look worth taking on a fifty-fifty
basis and are uncontradicted and backed up by the experiences of
other people, but have been thoroughly investigated and found to
have solid reasons for taking them. In other words, we may be
able to discover a "system" for life's gamble that
mathematically, so to speak, ought to work. Then, says Cameades,
we have a basis for action that is probable, undisputed, and
tested (Fuller, Philosophy, pp., 277,278).
Clitomachus (sometimes spelled Cleitomachus) was the third
leader. He attacked the three degrees of probability, opting for
a more uniform system of Skepticism.
Sensationalistic Skepticism was
the last of the classical schools of Skepticism. Its two most
prominent leaders were Aenesidemus of Gnossus (first century
B.C.) and Sextus Empiricus (200 A.D.). Aenesidemus exposed what
he felt were fallacious tests for truth: sensation and confirmed
opinion. He felt that these were subjective tests and could not
be trusted. However, he had no objective tests for truth and
instead was a confirmed skeptic, viewing life and existence as
uncertain but livable on the basis of custom and probability.
Sextus Empiricus was a doctor, from the empiricist school of
doctors, and he put forth the maxim that life should be ordered
by observation, or empiricism. Loyal to skepticism, Sextus
promoted the study of Socrates' remark, "All that I know is
that I know nothing.
"Sextus set forth his
skepticism as follows:
The arch_, or motive, for skepticism was the hope of reaching
ataraxia, the state of "unperturbedness"..... Sextus
Empiricus' skepticism had three stages: antithesis, epoch_
(suspension of judgment), and ataraxia. The first stage involved
a presentation of contradictory claims about the same subject.
These claims were so constructed that they were in opposition to
one another, and appeared equally probable or improbable. . . .
The second state is epoch_, or the suspension of judgment.
Instead of either asserting or denying any one claim about the
subject at hand, one must embrace all mutually inconsistent
claims and withhold judgment on each of them. The final stage is
ataraxia, a state of unperturbedness, happiness, and peace of
mind. When that occurs one is freed from dogmatism. He can live
peacefully and undogmatically in the world, following his natural
inclinations and the laws or customs of society (Geisler and
Feinberg, Philosophy, pp. 85,86).
Skepticism died out for the most part during the ascendency of
Chris-tianity. It did not become a noticeable philosophical
movement again until the post-Reformation period of western
European thought with Bishop John Wilkins (1614-1672) and Joseph
Glanvill (1636-1680). They are sometimes called "mitigated
skeptics". While clinging tenaciously to one area of
skepticism, they compromised by not embracing skepticism as the
answer to all knowledge problems in all fields. They
distinguish-ed between two types of knowledge. The first type,
which they agreed was unreliable, was called "infallibly
certain knowledge." Nothing, in other words, could be known
infallibly and certainly. However, the sec-ond type of knowledge,
by which one could order life, was called "in-dubitably
certain knowledge." This was knowledge that one had no
reason, experience, evidence, or report by which to doubt its
veracity. Using this knowledge, Wilkins and Glanvill developed
their own system of deter-mining truth within the limits of
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) wrote
at the same time as Wilkins and Glanvill, although he is not
considered to be a "mitigated skeptic." As a Christian
theist, he used skepticism as a tool to prove the existence of
God. Rather than seeing skepticism as an end in itself, he saw it
as the way to begin to show the undeniability of the existence of
For Descartes, skepticism was not
the conclusion of some argument, but the method whereby all doubt
could be overcome. Descartes claimed that it is possible to
arrive at indubitable knowledge through the rigorous and
systematic application of doubt to one's beliefs (ibid., p. 91).
From the time of Descartes, the majority of such thinkers have
been atheists or agnostics. We will treat some of these skeptical
thinkers more thoroughly in the historical sections on atheism
and agnosticism. However, we will mention them briefly here.
David Hume (1711-1776) is known
as a metaphysical' skeptic. He believed that it was impossible to
have any accurate knowledge about anything metaphysical. He
pointed out that standards of probability for beliefs go beyond
our immediate experience and must be accepted with some measure
Nicholas Horvath in his book, Philosophy, explains that:
Hume claimed that only sense-knowledge based on experience is
possible. Ideas are mere copies of sense impressions. Impressions
and ideas constitute the human intellect. Ideas are not entirely
unconnected; there is a bond of union between them and one calls
up another. This phenomenon is called association of ideas.
Neither material nor spiritual
substances exist in reality; their ideas are purely imaginative
concepts, being nothing other than a constant association of
impressions. Likewise there is nothing in man!s experience that
justifies a notion of necessary connection or causation; cause
and effect designate merely a regular succession of ideas. Since
the principle of causality is mere expectation due to custom, no
facts outside consciousness are known to man.
Granted the negation of
substance, the existence of God and the immortality of the human
soul are only hypothetical. Freedom of will is an illusion;
virtue is that which pleases, and vice is that which displeases
(Nicholas A. Horvath, Philosophy, Woodbury, NY Barrons
Educational Series, Inc., 1974, pp. 88,89).
More recently, A. J. Ayer (1910-1970), a limited skeptic, taught
that any talk about metaphysics is meaningless. In addition,
Albert Camus (1913-1960), one of the most important of the
so-called "irrational" skeptics asserted that there is
no meaning, no knowledge that is objectively true, and no
objective value. The entire history of skepticism has the same
basic theme. Is suspends judgment about truth. At various times
skeptics have said that even their statement of skepticism is
doubtful. At other times they have said that the one
non-skeptical statement is the same statement, that skepticism is
Although the term atheism as a reference to the belief that God
(or gods) does (do) not exist dates from the late sixteenth
century, Niccolo Machiavelli (d. 1527) had already promoted a
social ethic which did not depend on belief in, or the existence
of, a supreme God. In his satirical essay, The Prince, he taught
that the ruler ought to rule wisely and justly in order to secure
his position and to satisfy his ego, rather than to satisfy some
divine mandate. Machiavelli was one of the first to champion the
then novel idea that "the end justifies the means." He
argued that a ruler should not burden his subjects too much, not
because it would be morally wrong to do so, but because it would
not be expedient, for his oppressed subjects would then be more
likely to revolt, depose him, and perhaps even kill him for his
cruelty. Although Machiavelli cannot be termed an actual atheist,
his system for successful governorship does not depend on, or
presuppose, any divine order to this world.
Ideas from many philosophers, not
all of whom were actually atheists, helped shape the atheistic
philosophy of today.
During the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, the Baron P.
H. T d'Holbach referred to an atheist as
a man who destroys the dreams and chimerical beings that are
dangerous to the human race so that men can be brought back to
nature, to experience, and to reason (Enclyclopaedia Britannica,
Chicago, et. al.: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1978,
Macropaedia, II, p. 259).
As a brief and circumscribed overview of the history of atheism,
we will review some of the contributions to modem atheism made by
Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Comte, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Sartre.
Ideas from philosophers such as Bayle, Spinoza, Fichte, and Hume,
although not mentioned here, also contributed to the development
of modem atheistic thought.
Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) was
the man whose writings became an inspiration for the modem
atheistic movement. He was one of the first prominent
philosophers to advance the idea that God' was dependent upon the
world at least as much as the world was dependent upon God. He
said that without the world God is not God. In some way, God
needed his creation. This was the first step in saying that,
since God was not sufficient in Himself, he was then unnecessary
and ultimately imaginary.
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was
an early prominent atheistic philosopher. He denied all
supernaturalism and attributed all talk about God to talk about
nature. Man, he said, is dependent not on God, but on nature.
Feuerbach promoted what is sometimes referred to as the
wishfulfillment idea of God. He postulated that the idea of God
arose as a result of men desiring to have some sort of
supernatural Being as an explanation for their own existence and
the events they observed around them. This wish, or desire, is
the seed from which the God-myth grew. Feuerbach thought this
hypothesis proved that God actually did not exist. Hegel and
Feuerbach strongly influenced Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his
English collaborator, Frederich Engels (1820-1895). Marx, an
avowed atheist, preached that religion is the opiate of the
people and the enemy of all progress. Part of the task of the
great proletariat revolution is the destruction of all religion.
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was an early contemporary of Marx and
Engels. He believed that God was an irrelevant superstition. As a
result, Comte divided human development into three main stages:
"The Theological, or fictitious," "the
Metaphysical, or abstract" and "the Scientific, or
positive". In the first the human mind looks for first
causes and "supposes all phenomena to be produced by the
immediate action of supernatural beings!' The second is a
transitional stage where the mind searches for "abstract
forces" behind phenomena. But in the third and ultimate
stage man's mind applies itself to the scientific study of the
laws according to which things work. God and the supernatural are
left behind as irrelevant superstition (Colin Brown, Philosophy
and the Christian Faith, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
1968, pp. 241, 142).
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is often called the Father of the
Death of God School. He laid the cornerstone for later nihilists
by teaching that since God does not exist, man must devise his
own way of life.
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) and
Martin Heidegger (1889-1971) were two prominent existentialist
thinkers who discussed the ambiguous (and therefore meaningless)
nature of religious transcendence. In addition, Heidegger
stressed that one's salvation lay in his own independence as an
individual separated from every other individual, including, of
course, any sort of God.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1981) was
the most popular proponent of existentialism. He argued that man
not only creates his own destiny, each man has only himself as
the sole justification for his existence. There is no ultimate,
objective, eternal meaning to life. An individual simply exists
without reference to others.
A good example of atheistic perspective is contained in the
Humanist Manifesto (1933). It was composed and signed by leading
secular humanists who declared, in part, that "Humanism is
faith in the supreme value and self-perfectability of human
personality". Although there have been many other important
thinkers in the history of atheism, these are representative of
the most influential contributors shaping modem atheistic
thought. Other modem atheistic thinkers are discussed in some of
the references mentioned in the bibliography.
Although agnosticism is a very broad field, we have chosen to
limit our historical discussion of it to three of the most
influential philosophers in its recent expressions. As we stated
before, there is some overlap among atheism, agnosticism and
skepticism, and many of the philosophers important in the
development of one are also important to the others.
David Hume (1711-1776), known for
promoting metaphysical skepticism, showed the close marriage
between skepticism and agnosticism. As a British Empiricist, he
declared that the probabalistic standards for beliefs go beyond
our immediate experience. We act on faith, then, not on
knowledge. We do not know for sure: we are agnostic. However, we
still act, having chosen to trust faith while at the same time
being prepared for faith to let us down. Belief is not to be
confused with ultimate truth, which is unknowable.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804),
although a theist, developed Hume's skepticism into metaphysical
agnosticism. He believed it was impossible to know reality and
consequently impossible to know metaphysical reality
Colin Brown credits T. H. Huxley
(1825-1895) with the term agnostic.
The word agnosticism is of much more recent coinage. It is
generally ascribed to T. H. Huxley, the Victorian scientist and
friend of Charles Darwin, who devised it to describe his own
state of mind. He used it, not to deny God altogether, but to
express doubt as to whether knowledge could be attained, and to
protest ignorance on a great many things that the -ists and the
-ites about me professed to be familiar with. (ibid., p. 132).
Hume, Kant and Huxley represent a short history of contemporary
agnosticism, which is distinguished by its assertion that one
cannot know. Other prominent agnostics include Charles Darwin and
Arguments Against the Existence of God
We will now summarize five types of arguments most non-theists
use against the existence of God, and then give a Christian
response to each. Space limitations preclude direct quotes, but
some of the most important thinkers on these arguments include
Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel in addition to those we refer to.
It is not important here to distinguish atheism, agnosticism, and
skepticism from each other since nonbelievers of all three
persuasions can use each of the arguments in various forms. But
an understanding of these five arguments will give the reader
useful principles for responding to many of the arguments against
These areas of our divisions
(languages, knowledge, moral concepts, scientific method, and
logic) are not strictly demarcated nor are they generally
accepted philosophical categorizations, but they are simply made
as a convenience to the reader. They will help you find that area
of argument in which you are most particularly interested.
Example: Talking about God is meaningless.
"There are only two kinds of meaningful statements. A
statement can be purely definitional (all triangles have three
sides) without telling us about the real world (whether triangles
actually exist). Or, a statement can be about reality by
containing empirically verifiable (testable by the senses)
information (this is a triangle). To talk about God in purely
definitional statements does not tell us if He actually exists.
However, because He is not empirically verifiable, we cannot make
empirically verifiable statements about Him. Since purely
definitional and empirically verifiable statements are the only
kinds of meaningful statements there are, to talk of God's
existence is meaningless or [as it is often put] nonsense".
This argument does not actually deny that God exists, but
declares all talk about Him futile. Leading thinkers on this
subject include A. J. Ayer, Paul van Buren, and Ludwig
Example: We can't know the real.
"We can know about things in the real world through the use
of our senses and our mind. However, since our senses are
imperfect and selective, and our mind is affected by all it has
experienced previously, our perception of a thing is thereby
affected. Therefore, we can know a thing as it is to us, but not
as it is in itself."
This does not argue specifically
against God's existence, but can be used to deny that one can
know objectively about God. Immanuel Kant and David Hume were
instrumental in developing this theory of knowledge.
Example: The Christian God could not allow evil.
"If there were an all-powerful God, then He could destroy
all evil. If He were all-good, then He would want to destroy all
evil. If your all-powerful, all-good God existed, then He would
have had to destroy all evil. Evil exists. Therefore, your
all-powerful, all-good God must not exist. Or, if He exists, He
is not able to do away with evil."
This idea does not argue against
the existence of all gods, but only against this
"all-powerful, all-good God". From this basis the other
problems of evil emerge. Among those issues are the suffering of
innocents, natural calamities, etc. One of the earliest
proponents of this idea was Epicurus. More modem thinkers were
David Hume and J. L. Mackie.
Example 1: God is man's wish.
"Man feels inadequate in himself. He wishes for Someone who
is big enough to rescue him from life's tragedies. He desires God
to exist. God arises from man's mind. Therefore, God has no
objective reality He does not exist ".
Leading supporters of this idea included Ludwig Feuerbach,
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.
Example 2: God is a result of superstitious belief (sociology).
"Primitive man could not explain the world around him in
naturalterms. He invented God to explain the unknown. Today
science has shown us the natural laws governing our world.
Natural laws explain everything. We no longer need belief in God
to explain things. Therefore, God does not exist ".
Some of those instrumental in developing this argument included
David Hume, Sir James George Frazer, Sir Edward Burnett Taylor,
and Bertrand Russell.
Example 1: God's all-powerfulness is contradictory.
"There cannot be an omnipotent (all-powerful) God. Such a
God would be stuck with the following contradictory questions
1. Can God create a rock too heavy for Him to lift?
2. Can God make 2 + 2 = 6?
3. Can God make Himself go out of existence and then pop back
4. Can God make a square circle?
If God is all-powerful, He should be able to do these things.
But, in doing them, He is thwarting His own omnipotence. He must
Example 2: God's attributes contradict each other.
"How can one being possess both love and wrath? How can God
be all-loving (giving man free will) but be all-knowing
(predestining mans actions by His foreknowledge)? How can
God be absolutely good and yet absolutely free (able to choose
evil)? Because God's attributes contradict each other logically,
He must not exist."
Encountering a variety of arguments against the existence of God
at one time can be overwhelming. Many Christian students who are
unfamiliar with secular philosophy sometimes are at a loss to
answer those arguments when they are first confronted with them.
We have presented a few of the most common arguments which are
representative of the skeptical/agnostic/atheistic attitude
prevalent in many secular circles today. (For further discussion
of such arguments, see the books referred to in the
Bibliography.) We have found that most arguments against the
existence of God can be answered by the simple principles we will
present below. Due to space limitations the arguments and our
responses have been simplified. However, we are confident that
the reader can establish a reasonable defense against such
arguments with the following principles and personal study.
Refutation of Skepticism
Skepticism is a powerful tool in the hands of an agnostic or
atheist. As we saw in our definition and history sections,
skepticism is utilized in many areas of non-theistic thought. It
often is presupposed or asserted openly as part of an argument
against the existence of God. For this reason, we shall deal with
the claims of skepticism before we deal with the specific
arguments raised above.
Skepticism is ultimately
meaningless. It refutes itself. If one declares, "You can
never be sure about anything," he is catching himself in his
own trap. If we can be sure of nothing, then we cannot be sure of
the state-ment, "nothing is certain. " But, if that
statement is objectively true, then we can be sure about one
thing, the statement. But, if we can be sure about the statement,
then the statement must be false. If the statement is false, then
we cannot be sure. The inexorable fate of the skeptic is to be
condemned by his own sentence.
The Sahakians comment:
Nihilism and Skepticism are both self-contradictory and
self-defeating philosophies. If truth does not exist (Nihilism),
then the posited truth of Nihilism could not exist. If knowledge
is impossible (Skepticism), how could we ever come to know that?
Apparently some things can be known.
Even the less extreme view of Protagoras is self-defeating, as
demonstrated by Platos charming argument in the following
paragraphs. .: .
PROTAGORAS: Truth is relative, it is only a matter of opinion.
SOCRATES: You mean that truth is mere subjective opinion?
PROTAGORAS: Exactly. What is true for you is true for you, and
what is true for me, is true for me. Truth is subjective.
SOCRATES: Do you really mean that? That my opinion is true by
virtue of its being my opinion?
PROTAGORAS: Indeed I do.
SOCRATES: My opinion is: Truth is absolute, not opinion, and that
you, Mr. Protagoras, are absolutely in error. Since this is my
opinion, then you must grant that it is true according to your
PROTAGORAS: You are quite correct, Socrates. (Sahakian and
Sahakian, p. 28.)
Geisler and Feinberrg continue in the same vein:
... The skeptic's assertion that we cannot know anything is
itself a claim about knowledge. If the skeptic's claim is false,
then we need not worry about the skeptics charge. On the
other hand, if it is true, then his position is
self-contradictory because we know at least one thing -that we
cannot know anything.
... But suppose that the skeptic
responds by saying that we have misunderstood his claim. He is
not claiming that the sentence, "You cannot know
anything" is either true or false ... The skeptic's position
is shown to be necessarily false, for his is still a claim about
knowledge: "For all sentences, we know that we cannot know
whether they are true or false. " Therefore, total or
complete skepticism is rationally inconsistent (Geisler and
Feinberg, Philosophy, p. 94).
Christians who often encounter non-believers (agnostics or
atheists) find that many arguments against the existence of God
or the claims of Christianity are basically claims that one
cannot know. They are essentially skeptical arguments and are
self-refuting. This one principle is sufficient for answering
several anti-theistic arguments.
Refutation of Language Argument
The language argument is self-refuting, just as skepticism is
self-refuting. To say that one cannot talk meaningfully about God
is to talk meaningfully about God. Either one's statement
("One cannot talk meaningfully about God") is
meaningful, in which case it gives us meaningful information
about God, or it is, itself, meaningless, in which case we need
not heed it. As Geisler puts it,
... the principles of empirical verifiability as set forth by
Ayer is self-defeating. For it is neither purely definitional nor
strictly factual. Hence, on its own grounds it would fall into
the third category of non-sense statements.... the attempt to
limit meaning to the definitional or to the verifiable is to make
a truth claim that must itself be subject to some test. If it
cannot be tested, then it becomes an unfalsifiable view (Norman
Geisler, Christian Apologetics, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, 1976, p. 23).
Refutation of Knowledge Argument
One who adheres completely to the idea that we cannot know the
real is another example of one who refutes himself. Reasonably we
could say that we do not know everything about the real, but it
is self-defeating to say one knows nothing about the real. If one
really knows nothing about the real, then his statement ("I
know nothing about the real") is false: he really knows the
truth of his statement. His statement cannot be true unless,
contradictorily, it is also false. The Christian philosopher
Warren Young put it this way:
The basis of the possibility of
knowing rests on a belief in the rationality of the human mind.
Apart from belief in rationality, knowledge is impossible. Unless
the organizing ability of the mind be granted, it is impossible
to know. The data organized by reason are the data of human
experience. In spite of the skeptic's rejection of the
reliability of experience, his answer is not final. Man is not
only deceived by his senses, but in almost all cases he knows
that he is being deceived. His reason leads him to compensate for
possible deception, to interpret sense data properly, and so he
is able to know (Young, Philosophy, p. 62).
Geisler also discusses this dilemma with his analysis of complete
agnosticism. He writes,
Complete agnosticism is self-defeating; it reduces to the
self-destructing assertion that "one knows enough about
reality in order to affirm that nothing can be known about
reality". This statement provides within itself all that is
necessary to falsify itself. For if one knows something about
reality, then he surely cannot affirm in the same breath that all
of reality is unknowable. And of course if one knows nothing
whatsoever about reality, then he has no basis whatsoever for
making a statement about reality. It will not suffice to say that
his knowledge about reality is purely and completely negative,
that is, a knowledge of what one cannot meaningfully affirm that
something is not that it follows that total agnosticism is
self-defeating because it assumes some knowledge about reality in
order to deny any knowledge of reality (Geisler, Apologetics, p.
Refutation of Moral Concepts Argument
The argument of the problem of evil and its various forms and
development is probably the most frequently used argument against
the existence of God. Whole books are devoted to a Christian
reconciliation of the problem. Whole books are devoted to
exploring the ideas of non-Christian proponents of the concept.
Many sub-arguments against God's existence come from this basic
argument. Why does God allow babies to suffer and die? Why are
there murder victims? Why does God allow natural calamities?,
etc. By understanding the basic problems with the view, one can
learn the principles for answering the different forms the view
A good way to find answers to
such arguments is to look at each step of the argument and see
whether or not it tells the truth. If even one step of the
argument is invalid or untrue, then the weight of the entire
argument crashes down. When we examine this argument, we find
little disagreement with its first step (premise): "If there
were an all-powerful God, He could destroy all evil". We
begin to have problems with the second premise: "If He were
all-good, He would want to destroy all evil". There are two
problems here. First, an all-good God may have beneficent uses
for evil. Second, the arguer has not taken into consideration the
element of time. What if God were to use evil for a time and
then, ultimately, destroy it? That would allow for a good God and
yet also allow evil at this present time.
Richard Purtill sums it up this way:
Now on this view there can be a problem of evil, since some
things that happen in the world seem to be contrary to what a
loving God would permit. But the problem must somehow be soluble,
since the events we condemn and the moral law by which we condemn
them are both traceable to the same Source. If God is what
Christianity says he is, he is the God of Love and justice, and
also the God who permits apparently useless suffering. It must
be, then, that there is a reconciliation. (Perhaps the suffering
is not useless, for example.)
Thus evil is a problem for
Christianity, but not an objection to it. The view that admits a
problem holds out the hope of a solution (Purtill, Reason, p.
Geisler and Feinberg point out some of the problems:
The theist responds by first pointing out that (the) premise...
places an unjustified time limit on God. It says, in effect, that
since God has not yet done anything to defeat evil we are
absolutely sure He never will. But this cannot be known for
certain by any finite mind. It is possible that God will yet
defeat evil in the future. This is indeed what Christians
believe, for it is predicted in the Bible (Revelation 20-22)
(Geisler and Feinberg, pp. 274,275).
Refutation of Scientific Methods Arguments
To say that mans wish for God to exist proves that God does
not exist is completely illogical. Because I wish for my children
to grow up as strong Christians is no proof that they will grow
up as atheists. My wishing does not make things exist, nor does
it preclude things from existing. The arguments for the existence
of God must be taken on their own merits, regardless of whether
men have wished for God to exist. Does the fact that atheists
wish for God not to exist prove that He does exist? Of course
not. One must look at the evidence.
In the same manner, the idea that
man (or at least some men) derived their belief in God from
superstition says nothing about whether or not that God actually
exists. In Ideas of the Great Philosophers, this is identified as
the genetic fallacy in logic:
.According to this argument, religion was spawned in fear,
superstition, and ignorance; and fear of the unknown, at a time
of ignorance concerning scientific causes, drove man to
Logicians criticize the preceding
argument as an example of a genetic fallacy, the error of
assuming that a point has been proved merely because it has been
traced to its source. It may be of interest, and definitely is of
interest to at least the psychologist and the historian, to
ascertain how our religious beliefs emerged and what gave them
their initial impetus, but so far as proof of Atheism is
concerned, such factors are irrelevant. Thus, evidence that a
particular science grew out of magic or alchemy does not imply
that science today is invalid (Sahakian and Sahakian, Ideas, p.
Richard Purtill quickly took apart the argument when he wrote:
Let us begin with the accusation that Christianity represents a
pre-scientific, "magical" view of the world. Of course
Christianity is pre-scientific in the sense that it began before
modern science began. So, for that matter, did mathematics,
logic, history, and a great many other things. But that
Christianity is opposed to a genuinely scientific view of the
universe we will deny. As for the accusation that Christianity
represents a "magical" view of the universe,
"magical" here either just means un- or antiscientific,
or else it has some connection with historical beliefs in magic.
This is a confusion. Magic, as believed in for many centuries,
was an attempt to exert power over nature by means of words,
ceremonies, mixtures of materials, etc. It was essentially an
attempt of a sort of technology, an attempt to master forces that
would give men power, wealth, and secret knowledge. Insofar as it
was an attempt to satisfy curiosity and give power over nature,
it was the ancestor of science rather than of religion.
Christianity, on the other hand,
believes that certain wonderful events have occurred, sometimes
as an answer to prayer. But these events are the result of the
will of the Person who created nature and its laws, and could not
be predicted, demanded, or forced. The effects of these events
may sometimes be beneficial to men but their purpose is to reveal
something about God or to authenticate such a revelation. The
whole attitude and atmosphere of magic and Christianity are
opposed. On the one hand you have the magician, with his secret
knowledge, forcing certain things to occur by his spells or
potions. On the other hand you have the Christian saint with his
message for all men, praying that God's will be done, and
sometimes finding a marvelous response to his prayer. The two
things are poles apart (Purtill, Reason, pp. 38,39).
Refutation of Logic Arguments
Arguments which attempt to make the Christian God
self-contradictory are many. However, almost all of them concern
God's attributes. The most popular target is God's omnipotence or
all-powerfulness. We listed just a few of the arguments that
supposedly argue against the omnipotence of God. What does it
mean when we can say that God is all-powerful? Do we mean that he
can do anything we can imagine?
No. When we say that God is all-powerful, we mean that anything
which is capable of being done, God can do. He cannot do the
logically or intrinsically impossible. The Christian theologian
James Oliver Buswell, Jr. writes,
... omnipotence does not mean that God can do anything, but it
does mean that He can do with power anything that power can do.
He has all the power that is or could be.
Can God make two plus two equal six? This is a question which is
frequently asked by skeptics and by children. We reply by asking
how much power it would take to bring about this result. The
absurdity of the question is not too difficult to see. Would the
power of a ton of dynamite make two plus two equal six? or the
power of an atom bomb? or of a hydrogen bomb? When these
questions are asked it is readily seen that the truth of the
multiplication tables is not in the realm of power. Power has
nothing to do with it. When we assert that God is omnipotent, we
are talking about power (James Oliver Buswell, Jr., A Systematic
Theology of the Christian Religion, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1962, pp. 63,64).
Sahakian and Sahakian point out that this sort of logical
argument is logically inconsistent. It is known as the fallacy of
... When contradictory premises are present in an argument, one
premise cancels out the other. It is impossible for one or the
other of the two premises to be true, but not for both to be
simultaneously true. Note the contradictory premises in the
following questions: "If God is all-powerful, can he put
himself out of existence, then come to life with twice the power
he had originally?" "Can God make a stone so heavy that
he cannot lift it?" "Can God make a round square?"
"What would happen if an irresistible force met an immovable
object?" (One student's answer: "An inconceivable
smash!") (Sahakian and Sahakian, Ideas, p. 23).
The principle is spelled out clearly in Thomas Warrens
Rather than saying that God cannot do the things just referred
to, it would be more in harmony with the truth to say simply that
such things cannot be done at all! God is infinite in power, but
power meaningfully relates only to that which can be done, to
what is possible of accomplishment -not to what is impossible! It
is absurd to speak of any power (even infinite power) being able
(having the power) to do what simply cannot be done. God can do
whatever is possible to be done, but he will do only what is in
harmony with his nature. Rather than saying that God cannot make
a four-sided triangle, one would more accurately (or, perhaps,
more meaningfully) say (in the light of the fact that the word
"triangle" means a three-sided figure and cannot refer
to any four-sided figure) that the making of four-sided triangles
simply cannot be done (Thomas B. Warren, Have Atheists Proved
There is No God?, Nashville, TN: Gospel Advocate Company, 1972,
With the preceding thorough refutation of the problems with God's
omnipotence, it seems hardly worthwhile to examine the other
claims to God's self-contradictions. However, a quick look will
show that such purported contradictions are not contradictions at
all. The Christian God has a unified nature of complementary
attributes. None cancel out any others.
If we simply examine the
presuppositions of the arguments, we can see their problems. For
example, the skeptic is presupposing that God's love and his
wrath (the pouring-out of his justice) are mutually exclusive. We
would answer by bringing it to a human level. No one would argue
that a father's discipline of his child or a judge's punishment
of a criminal proves that the father or judge have no love. On
the contrary, their justice should work with their love.
While we would agree that it is loving for God to give man free
will, we would not agree that foreknowledge causes
predestination. Merely knowing the future does not predetermine
it. Finally, freedom for the infinitely good and eternal (never
changing) God does not have to include the ability to choose evil
to be genuine freedom. Freedom does not mean freedom to
contradict one's nature. God's nature is immutably good, holy,
and perfect. (By perfect we mean complete). His will is the
selfexpression of His nature and as such His will is necessarily
good, holy, and perfect.
Geisler sums up the unity of God's attributes in the following
Perfections such as love and justice are not incompatible in God.
They are different, but not everything different is incompatible.
What is different, and sometimes at least seemingly incompatible
in this world, is not necessarily incompatible in God. For
example, there can be such a thing as just-love or
loving-justice. Likewise, God can be all-knowing and all-loving,
for his infinite knowledge may be exercised in allowing men the
freedom to do evil without coercing them (in accordance with his
love) against their will so that through it all he may achieve
(by infinite power) the greatest good for all (in accordance with
his justice) (Geisler, Apologetics, p. 229).
While we have just touched the surface of the broad fields of
atheism, agnosticism, and skepticism, we have given viable
Christian responses to some of the most significant arguments
against the existence of God. We urge the reader to check the
bibliography for more intensive study of the subject.
As Christians in a non-Christian
world we alternately defend the gospel (1 Peter 3:15) and
aggressively proclaim the truth (Acts 2:14-39). God is no
stranger to logic and philosophy. His Word will endure long after
the thoughts of men have turned to ashes (1 Peter 1:25). The
apostle Paul was not afraid to preach Jesus Christ among the
non-believing philosophers of his day. He proclaimed to them:
For while I was passing through and examining the objects of your
worship, I also found an altar with this inscription, "TO AN
UNKNOWN GOD! " What therefore you worship in ignorance, this
I proclaim to you.
The God who made the world and
all things in it since He is Lord of heaven and earth, does not
dwell in temples made with hands; neither is He served by human
hands, as though He needed anything, since He Himself gives to
all life and breath and all things... that they should seek God,
if perhaps they might grope for Him, though He is not far from
each one of us (Acts 17:23-25,27 NASB).
Atheism Extended Bibliography
Note: The Bibliography is divided into three parts. The first
part lists general references. The second part lists books and
authors from a generally non-theistic position. The third part
lists books and authors which can be used to support a general
theistic position. Not all of the authors listed in this third
section are evangelical Christians.
Angeles, Peter, Dictionary of Philosophy. NY. Harper and Row,
Avey, Albert E., Handbook in the History of Philosophy. NY.
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1954.
Frost, S. E., Jr., Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers.
Garden City, NY. Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1942, 1962.
Fuller, B. A. G., A History of Philosophy NY- Holt, Rinehart and
Hook, Sidney, ed., Philosophy and History. A Symposium. NY- New
York University Press, 1963.
Horvath, Nicholas A. Philosophy. Woodbury, NY: Barron's
Educational Series, Inc., 1974.
Joad, C. E. M., Guide to Philosophy. London: Victor Gollancz,
Runes, Dagobert D., ed., Dictionary of Philosophy. Tbtowa, NJ:
Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1960, 1962.
Sahakian, William, History of Philosophy NY- Harper and Row,
Sahakian, William and Mabel, Ideas of the Great Philosopher's.
NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966.
Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth, and Logic. NY. Dover Publications,
Dewey, John, A Common Faith. New Haven, CT. Yale University
Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christianity. NY. Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1957.
Flew, Antony, God and Philosophy. NY. Dell Books, 1966.
Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion. NY. Doubleday and
Kaufmann, Walter, Critique of Religion and Philosophy. NY: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1958.
________________, ed., The Portable Nietzsche. NY. The Viking
Press, 1954. Madden, Edward H., and Peter H. Hare, Evil and the
Concept of God Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers,
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, On Religion. NY. Schocken
Matson, Wallace I., The Existence of God. Ithaca, NY- Cornell
University Press, 1965.
Nielson, Kai, Contemporary Critiques of Religion. NY: Seabury
_________________,Ethics without God Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
_________________,Skepticism. NY. St. Martin's Press, 1973.
Russell, Bertrand, Religion and Science. NY: Oxford University
_________________,Why I Am Not a Christian. NY: Simon and
Sartre, jean-Paul, Existentialism and Human Emotions. NY.-
Philosophical Library, 1957.
Adler, Mortimer J., How to Think about God: A Guide for the
20thCentury Pagan. NY. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1980.
Baillie, John, Our Knowledge of God. NY. Charles Scribner's Sons,
Benignus, Brother, Nature, Knowledge and God: An Introduction to
Thomistic Philosophy Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishing
Bowne, Borden P., Theism. NY: American Book Company, 1887,1902.
Brown, Colin, Philosophy and the Christian Faith. Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1968.
Buswell, James Oliver, Jr., A Systematic Theology of the
Christian Religion. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
Carnell, Edward J., A Philosophy of the Christian Religion. Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1952.
Custance, Arthur C., Evolution or Creation? Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1976.
Fairbairn, A. M., The Philosophy of the Christian Religion. NY-
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1903.
Fitch, William, God and Evil: Studies in the Mystery of Suffering
and Pain. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Flint, Robert, Agnosticism. NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903.
_______________, Anti-Theistic Theories. London: William
Blackwood and Sons,1899.
Geisler, Norman, Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1976.
________________,Philosophy of Religion. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1974.
________________, and Paul Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy:
A Christian Perspective. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House,
Gerstner, John, Reasons for Faith. NY: Harper and Row,
Gore, Charles, The Reconstruction of Belief London: John Murray,
Hackett, Stuart, The Resurrection of Theism. Chicago, IL: Moody
Hick, John, Arguments for the Existence of God. NY: Herder and
Jay, Eric G., The Existence of God. London: Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1946.
Lewis, C. S., Mere Christianity. NY. Macmillan Publishing
Company, Inc., 1952.
___________________, Miracles. NY- Macmillan Publishing Company,
Inc., 1947, 1960.
_________________, The Problem of Pain. NY. Macmillan Publishing
Com pany, Inc., 1943.
Mascall, E. L., Existence and Analogy. London: Longmans, Green
and Company, Ltd., 1949.
_________________, The Openness of Being: Natural Theology Today
Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1971.
_________________, Words and Images. NY. The Ronald Press
Mavrodes, George I., Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology
of Religion. NY. Random House, 1970.
Miceli, Vincent P., The Gods of Atheism. New Rochelle, NY:
Arlington House, 1971.
Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom, and Evil. NY: Harper and Row,
Purtill, Richard, Reason to Believe. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974.
Ross, James F., Philosophical Theology. NY: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.
_________________, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.
NY. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1972.
Schwarz, Hans, The Search for God. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1975.
Sillen, Edward, Ways of Thinking About God. NY. Sheed and Ward,
Taylor, Richard, Metaphysics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Warren, Thomas B., Have Atheists Proved There is No God?
Nashville, TN: Gospel Advocate Company, 1972.
Young, Warren, A Christian Approach to Philosophy. Grand Rapids,
ME Baker Book House, 1954.